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Seeing Through the Smoke and Fog: Applying a Consistent
Public Duty Doctrine in North Carolina After Myers v.
McGrady
Governments routinely provide important services to benefit the
public as a whole. For instance, police, officers and fire fighters
protect communities from easily identifiable dangers-such as
criminal acts and fires that destroy property. Likewise, safety
inspectors help communities prevent harm from equally common, but
less obvious dangers-such as latent construction defects. Yet, when
public officials fail to do their jobs properly, injuries may result, and
victims will understandably want some restitution for their injuries.
The extent to which injured plaintiffs should be permitted to recover
for damages caused by the negligence of government officials has
been the subject of an ongoing debate for many years.1 Some
jurisdictions have addressed this dilemma by utilizing the public duty
doctrine to prevent governmental entities from having to pay
anything for the mistakes of a government official when the official
acts for the benefit of the public as a whole.
As applied in North Carolina, the public duty doctrine "provides
that governmental entities and their agents owe duties only to the
general public, not to individuals, absent a 'special relationship' or
'special duty' between the entity and the injured party."2  This
doctrine stems from the basic tort law principle that a defendant
cannot be negligent unless he has violated a legal duty to the plaintiff
bringing the action.' The underlying concept of the public duty
doctrine is that a "public duty" is a responsibility conferred on a
government employee for the benefit of the community as a whole
and not for the benefit of specific individuals.4 Therefore, if a public
official does not owe a duty to particular individuals, then no
individual can rightfully claim that the official's negligence entitles
1. See infra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
2. Stone v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 347 N.C. 473,477-78, 495 S.E.2d 711,714 (1998).
3. See Martishius v. Carolco Studios, Inc., 355 N.C. 465, 473, 562 S.E.2d 887, 892
(2002) ("To prevail in a common law negligence action, a plaintiff must establish that the
defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty, that the defendant breached that duty, and that
the plaintiff's injury was proximately caused by the breach." (citing Hunt v. N.C. Dep't of
Labor, 348 N.C. 192, 195, 499 S.E.2d 747, 749 (1998))).
4. 63C AM. JUR. 2D Public Officers and Employees § 248 (1997) (citing Onofrio v.
Dep't of Mental Health, 562 N.E.2d 1341, 1344 (Mass. 1990)) (referring to the "public
duty rule").
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her to damages. In North Carolina, for example, the doctrine has
been used to protect police officers from liability when they fail to
prevent crime5 and to protect forest rangers from liability when they
fail to warn motorists of the danger of a nearby forest fire.6
The value of the public duty doctrine has been challenged
frequently in recent years.7 Commentators have criticized the
doctrine as being confusing,8 inconsistently applied, or unjust,9 and
some courts have refused to apply it at all. 10 Yet while some critics
5. See Braswell v. Braswell, 330 N.C. 363, 372, 410 S.E.2d 897, 902 (1991).
6. See Myers v. McGrady, 360 N.C. 460, 468, 628 S.E.2d 761, 767 (2006).
7. See, e.g., G. Kristian Miccio, Exiled from the Province of Care: Domestic Violence,
Duty and Conceptions of State Accountability, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 111, 120 (2005) (arguing
that the public duty versus private duty distinction is a "false dichotomy"); Stewart F.
Hancock, Jr., Municipal Liability Through a Judge's Eyes, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 925, 928-
30 (1993) (criticizing the public duty doctrine and arguing that the legislature, not the
courts, should determine who receives immunity).
8. See, e.g., Anita R. Brown-Graham, Local Governments and the Public Duty
Doctrine After Wood v. Guilford County, 81 N.C. L. REV. 2291, 2292 (2003) (referring to
the application of the public duty doctrine in North Carolina as "problematic").
9. See, e.g., Aaron R. Baker, Comment, Untangling the Public Duty Doctrine, 10
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 731, 747-48 (2005) (arguing that "[f]or the same reason the
doctrine of sovereign immunity was abrogated-the confused and irreconcilable results
obtained in distinguishing between governmental and proprietary functions-the public
duty doctrine should be abolished as well"); Suzanne M. Dardis, Note, Gleason v. Peters:
An Application of the Public Duty Rule as a Judicial Resurrection of Sovereign Immunity,
43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 706, 707 (1998) (recommending the abrogation of the public duty
doctrine); Gerald P. Krause, Comment, Municipal Liability: The Failure To Provide
Adequate Police Protection-The Special Duty Doctrine Should Be Discarded, 1984 WiS.
L. REV. 499, 500 (1984) (advocating for the application of ordinary tort principles to
municipal liability for failure to provide police protection); G. Braxton Price, Comment,
"Inevitable Inequities": The Public Duty Doctrine and Sovereign Immunity in North
Carolina, 28 CAMPBELL L. REV. 271, 273 (2006) (recommending the complete abrogation
of the public duty doctrine in North Carolina as an "unworkable, confusing, and unjust"
doctrine); Kelly M. Tullier, Note, Governmental Liability for Negligent Failure To Detain
Drunk Drivers, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 873, 904 (1992) (arguing that "the public duty
doctrine accomplishes the same unjust results as absolute sovereign immunity and, like
sovereign immunity, must be abolished").
10. See, e.g., Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 241-43 (Alaska 1976) (rejecting the public
duty doctrine), superseded by statute, 1977 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 37, § 3, as recognized in
Wilson v. Anchorage, 669 P.2d 569 (1983); Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664, 667 (Iowa
1979) (rejecting the public duty doctrine as a defense to negligent building inspections);
Jean W. v. Commonwealth, 610 N.E.2d 305, 307 (Mass. 1993) (rejecting the public duty
doctrine), superseded by statute, Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, 1993 Mass. Acts 1541,
§ 67, as recognized in Lawrence v. City of Cambridge, 664 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 1996);
Doucette v. Bristol, 635 A.2d 1387, 1390 (N.H. 1993) (stating that the public duty doctrine
has caused "legal confusion, tortured analysis, and inequitable results in practice"); Schear
v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 687 P.2d 728, 731 (N.M. 1984) (rejecting the public duty
doctrine); Coffee v. Milwaukee, 247 N.W.2d 132, 137 (Wis. 1976) (rejecting the public duty
doctrine). Arizona courts have also criticized (and ultimately rejected) the public duty
doctrine. For example, in Ryan v. State, 656 P.2d 597 (Ariz. 1982), the Arizona Supreme
Court reversed the trial court's order granting the State's motion for summary judgment
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oppose the use of the public duty doctrine, the legislatures and courts
in several states, including North Carolina, have continued endorsing
its application in some form."
Thus the pragmatic question for jurisdictions that support the
public duty doctrine becomes not merely whether to apply the
doctrine, but instead how to apply it clearly and consistently. In
Myers v. McGrady,"2 the Supreme Court of North Carolina answered
that question by adopting a functional test.
The Myers court unanimously held that the doctrine applied to
protect the North Carolina Department of Environmental and
Natural Resources ("NCDENR") in its duties to prevent and control
forest fires.13 Rejecting a narrow interpretation of the public duty
doctrine offered by the North Carolina Court of Appeals, the state
supreme court outlined a framework that focuses on whether an
agency's specific statutory duty is owed to the public at large. 4
This Recent Development first describes the application of the
common law public duty doctrine in Myers and discusses portions of
when an inmate from a state correctional facility escaped and, while robbing a
convenience store, shot a bystander. Id. at 597. The court determined that it would "no
longer engage in the speculative exercise of determining whether the tort-feasor has a
general duty to the injured party, which spells no recovery, or if he had a specific
individual duty which means recovery." Id. at 559. Arizona's legislature later superseded
the Ryan decision by passing the Actions Against Public Entities or Public Employees
Act. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-820 (2003). The Act "codified various common law
doctrines that conferred absolute and qualified immunity on various public entities and
employees." Tucson v. Fahringer, 795 P.2d 819, 820 (Ariz. 1990).
11. Some jurisdictions have endorsed the doctrine by judicial decision. See, e.g.,
Miller v. District of Columbia, 841 A.2d 1244, 1246 (D.C. 2004) (holding that" 'the duty to
provide public services is owed to the public at large, and, absent a special relationship
between the police and an individual, no specific legal duty exists' " (quoting Warren v.
District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1, 3 (D.C. 1981))); Rome v. Jordan, 426 S.E.2d 861, 862
(Ga. 1993) (holding that "the abrogation or waiver of sovereign immunity in Georgia did
not create a duty on the part of a municipality where none existed before"). Other states
have endorsed the public duty doctrine by statute. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.070
(2004) (providing broad immunity for municipalities against tort suits); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 258, § 10 (LexisNexis); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 99-D:1 (LexisNexis 2004) ("It is the
intent of this chapter to protect state officers.., who are subject to claims and civil actions
arising from acts committed within the scope of their official duty while in the course of
their employment for the state .... ); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-4, 41-13-3 (West 1978)
(establishing governmental civil immunity); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.80 (West 2006)
(limiting plaintiffs' ability to sue in tort). Interestingly, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts abrogated the public duty doctrine as contrary to the intentions of the
Massachusetts legislature, see Jean W., 610 N.E.2d at 307, only to have the legislature
enact a statute granting broad civil immunity to government, see MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
258, § 10 (LexisNexis).
12. 360 N.C. 460, 628 S.E.2d 761 (2006).
13. Id. at 463, 628 S.E.2d at 764.
14. Id.
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the doctrine's background that are critical to understanding the Myers
decision. Next, this Recent Development explains how the court
correctly differentiated the public duty doctrine and sovereign
immunity as two separate hurdles that plaintiffs must overcome to
hold state officials liable in tort. In Myers, the supreme court
distinguished between the partial abrogation of sovereign immunity
provided in the North Carolina State Tort Claims Act15 ("Tort Claims
Act") and the affirmative defense to liability provided by the
common law public duty doctrine. By recognizing the public duty
doctrine as a distinct common law doctrine, Myers implicitly supports
the proposition that the doctrine should be applied equally to both
state and local government actors. 16  Finally, this Recent
Development concludes that the functional test offered in Myers for
applying the public duty doctrine is clear, consistent, and correctly
focuses on the "nature of the duty"'7 conferred by statute, rather than
on the identity of the government actor.
The supreme court's unanimous decision in Myers to bar the
plaintiff's claim 8 does not diminish the plaintiff's loss. Gail Myers's
husband and the driver seated beside him died in an automobile
collision caused when smoke from a smoldering forest fire combined
with fog to reduce visibility on a North Carolina interstate. 9 Myers,
along with several other plaintiffs, sued the North Carolina Division
of Forest Resources ("NCDFR")2 ° alleging that NCDFR-through its
15. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291(a) (2005).
16. See Myers, 360 N.C. at 465, 628 S.E.2d at 766 ("The public duty doctrine is a
separate rule of common law negligence that may limit tort liability, even when the State
has waived sovereign immunity.").
17. This phrase originates from the opinion of the Supreme Court of North Carolina
in Wood v. Guilford County, 355 N.C. 161, 168, 558 S.E.2d 490, 496 (2002). See infra notes
61-67 and accompanying text (discussing the Wood decision).
18. Myers, 360 N.C. at 463, 628 S.E.2d at 764.
19. Id. at 461,628 S.E.2d at 763.
20. Id. at 462, 628 S.E.2d at 763. NCDFR is a division of NCDENR. Id. at 461,628
S.E.2d at 763. As administratrix of the decedent's estate, Ms. Myers initially brought suit
in superior court against the other drivers involved in the accident. Id. When these other
drivers brought third-party complaints against ranger Michael Bennett and NCDFR, the
decedent's estate then sued the State directly. Id. Under the Tort Claims Act, direct tort
actions against the State must be brought before the administrative court of the Industrial
Commission, rather than in superior court. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291(a). Thus, Ms.
Myers would not have been able to sue the State in a direct action in state court. Instead,
after the defendants brought the State into the suit for indemnification or contribution, the
plaintiff brought suit against the State as a third-party defendant under Rule 14 of the
North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. N.C. R. Civ. P. 14. Whether the plaintiff had
the procedural right to bring a direct action against the State in this suit is unclear, as the
supreme court found that the public duty doctrine protected NCDFR and thus did not
reach this procedural issue on appeal. See Myers, 360 N.C. at 465, 628 S.E.2d at 765-66.
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employee, forest ranger Michael Bennett-negligently failed to
extinguish the forest fire, left the fire while it was smoldering, and
failed to warn nearby motorists of the danger from rising smoke and
fog.2' The supreme court stated that the determinative issue in Myers
was whether NCDFR "may be liable in negligence for failure to
control a naturally occurring forest fire or failing to make safe a
public highway adjacent to the fire."22 In deciding that the Agency's
statutory duty was owed to the public as a whole and therefore was
not enforceable by individual plaintiffs,23 the court applied "the
common law public duty doctrine to the powers and duties conferred
upon NCDENR [by the General Assembly] to prevent, control and
extinguish forest fires."'24 While the supreme court's holding applies
specifically to NCDENR's statutory duties, the Myers court's
interpretation of the public duty doctrine will affect government tort
liability broadly because it reasserts the expansive language used in
prior cases to describe the doctrine' and distinguishes the public duty
doctrine from sovereign immunity.26
The roots of the public duty doctrine can be traced back to South
v. Maryland ex rel. Pottle,27 an 1855 United States Supreme Court
decision in which the Court held that the breach of a public duty
could not subject a sheriff to civil liability.28 The Supreme Court of
North Carolina adopted the public duty doctrine as a matter of state
law in Braswell v. Braswell,29 where the court explained that
municipalities cannot be held liable for failing to provide police
protection to prevent every criminal act.3" In Braswell, the supreme
21. Myers, 360 N.C. at 462, 628 S.E.2d at 763.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 463, 628 S.E.2d at 764.
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Stone v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 347 N.C. 473, 478-79, 495 S.E.2d 711, 714
(1998).
26. See Myers, 360 N.C. at 465, 628 S.E.2d at 766.
27. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 396 (1855).
28. See id. at 403.
29. 330 N.C. 363, 410 S.E.2d 897 (1991).
30. See id. at 370, 410 S.E.2d at 901. The public duty doctrine as stated in Braswell
protects municipalities only when they fail to prevent criminal acts. See id. By holding
that a forest ranger protecting against a naturally caused forest fire was shielded from
liability under the doctrine, Myers implicitly rejected any distinction based on whether the
government was responding to intentional misconduct of a party. See Myers, 360 N.C. at
463, 628 S.E.2d at 764. For an example of an earlier case in which the court of appeals
rejected the idea that the public duty doctrine barred only suits involving criminal acts, see
Lassiter v. Cohn, 168 N.C. App. 310, 315-18, 607 S.E.2d 688, 693-95 (2005) (barring a suit
against the city of Durham for the allegedly negligent actions of a police officer who
required the plaintiff to stand in an area where the plaintiff was then struck by a car),
discretionary review denied, 359 N.C. 633, 613 S.E.2d 686 (2005).
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court found that a county did not owe a legally enforceable duty to
protect a woman who expressed fears that her husband, a deputy
sheriff, would harm her.3 When the deputy sheriff later murdered his
wife, her son sued the sheriff's office, claiming that the county
government should be liable for not preventing his mother's death.
3 2
The supreme court barred the suit, stating that the public duty
doctrine protected local government from overwhelming liability and
prevented the plaintiff from bringing a claim that the municipality
had breached a duty owed to the public as a whole.33
Braswell set out two exceptions in which the public duty doctrine
would not insulate a government actor from liability:
(1) where there is a special relationship between the injured
party and the police, for example, a state's witness or informant
who has aided law enforcement officers; and (2) "when a
municipality, through its police officers, creates a special duty
by promising protection to an individual, the protection is not
forthcoming, and the individual's reliance on the promise of
protection is causally related to the injury suffered."34
Under the "special relationship" and "special duty" exceptions the
government owes a duty of care to the plaintiff only when the
government has a specific connection to the plaintiff or has made a
specific promise to the plaintiff.
35
While Braswell applied the public duty doctrine specifically to
local law enforcement,36 the supreme court later applied the public
duty doctrine to state agencies as well. In both Stone v. North
Carolina Department of Labor37 and Hunt v. North Carolina
Department of Labor,38 the supreme court found the public duty
doctrine applied as a defense to protect state agencies from liability
when performing inspections required by law.39 In Stone, the court
dismissed the claims of injured former employees and representatives
of employees killed in a workplace fire. n° The plaintiffs claimed that
31. See Braswell, 330 N.C. at 370-71, 410 S.E.2d at 901.
32. Id. at 366-69, 410 S.E.2d at 899-900.
33. Id. at 370-71, 410 S.E.2d at 901.
34. Id. at 371, 410 S.E.2d at 902 (quoting Coleman v. Cooper, 89 N.C. App. 188, 194,
266 S.E.2d 1, 6 (1988)).
35. See 57 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability § 84
(2001).
36. Braswell, 330 N.C. at 370, 410 S.E.2d at 901.
37. 347 N.C. 473, 495 S.E.2d 711 (1998).
38. 348 N.C. 192,499 S.E.2d 747 (1998).
39. See id. at 199,499 S.E.2d at 751; Stone, 347 N.C. at 482-83, 495 S.E.2d at 717.
40. Stone, 347 N.C. at 482-83, 495 S.E.2d at 717.
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State Occupational Safety and Health Division inspectors were
negligent in failing to properly inspect the workplace for fire
hazards.4 In Hunt, the supreme court barred the claim of a plaintiff
injured in a go-cart accident who alleged that the state inspector was
negligent in failing to require that the go-cart business owner install
adequate seatbelts.42 Together, Stone and Hunt established the rule
for applying the public duty doctrine relied upon in Myers.43
In Stone, the supreme court explained its application of the
public duty doctrine as follows:
Private persons do not possess public duties. Only
governmental entities possess authority to enact and enforce
laws for the protection of the public. If the State were held
liable for performing or failing to perform an obligation to the
public at large, the State would have liability when a private
person could not.'
The broad language used in Stone-and reaffirmed in Hunt-
suggested that the purpose of the public duty doctrine was to avoid
subjecting the State to greater liability than a private person. 5 Justice
Orr offered a strong dissent in Stone, arguing that the common law
did not provide any "basis for the majority taking the public duty
doctrine beyond the original bounds of local law enforcement. 46
However, after Hunt, the supreme court began to apply the public
duty doctrine very differently, based on whether the defendant was
an agent of the State or, instead, an agent of local government.47
While the supreme court articulated the public duty doctrine
with broad language in Stone and Hunt,48 the court later chose not to
apply the doctrine as broadly to local government. In two cases
decided on the same day in 2000, Lovelace v. City of Shelby 49 and
Thompson v. Waters," the supreme court narrowly restricted the
public duty doctrine as applied to local government actors.51 In
41. Id.
42. Hunt, 348 N.C. at 194-95, 499 S.E.2d at 748-49.
43. See Myers v. McGrady, 360 N.C. 460, 466-67, 628 S.E.2d 761, 766 (2006).
44. Stone, 347 N.C. at 478-79, 495 S.E.2d at 714 (citations omitted).
45. See id. at 478-79, 495 S.E.2d at 714; Hunt, 348 N.C. at 196, 499 S.E.2d at 749.
46. Stone, 347 N.C. at 484, 495 S.E.2d at 718 (Orr, J., dissenting); see also Hunt, 348
N.C. at 200, 499 S.E.2d at 751-52 (Orr, J., dissenting) (reaffirming his dissent in Stone).
47. See infra notes 50-67 and accompanying text.
48. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
49. 351 N.C. 458, 526 S.E.2d 652 (2000).
50. 351 N.C. 462, 526 S.E.2d 650 (2000).
51. Lovelace, 351 N.C. at 461, 526 S.E.2d at 654; Thompson, 351 N.C. at 463--64, 526
S.E.2d at 651.
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Lovelace, the supreme court refused to apply the public duty doctrine
to bar a claim against a 911 operator who was allegedly negligent in
failing to immediately dispatch fire fighters upon receiving a 911 call
reporting a burning home. 2 The supreme court held that the public
duty doctrine did not apply "to any local government agencies other
than law enforcement departments when they are exercising their
general duty to protect the public."53  In Thompson, the supreme
court further narrowed the doctrine's applicability to determine that
the public duty doctrine did not prevent homeowners from bringing a
tort claim against county inspectors for their alleged negligence in
failing to identify construction defects while the plaintiff's home was
being built.54 In doing so, the supreme court affirmed that the public
duty doctrine did not apply to local government beyond law
enforcement officers.5 Though the supreme court had previously
applied the public duty doctrine to protect state inspectors,5 6 it
refused to apply the same rule to local inspectors.57 Moreover, while
in Stone and Hunt the court applied the doctrine based on whether
the government was performing a duty owed to the public as a whole,
two years later in Lovelace and Thompson the court applied the
doctrine to municipalities based on whether the defendant was a law
enforcement officer. 5
8
Thus, the supreme court instituted different rules of application
for the public duty doctrine based on the identity of the actor
involved. First, the court gave more protection to state government
employees than it did to local government employees.59 Second, the
court distinguished "law enforcement" officers from all other local
government employees, affording the protection of the public duty
doctrine only to the former group.60
52. Lovelace, 351 N.C. at 460, 526 S.E.2d at 654.
53. Id. at 461, 526 S.E.2d at 654.
54. Thompson, 351 N.C. at 465, 526 S.E.2d at 652.
55. See id.
56. See Stone v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 347 N.C. 473, 482-83, 495 S.E.2d 711, 717
(1998).
57. Thompson, 351 N.C. at 465, 526 S.E.2d at 652.
58. See id.; Lovelace, 351 N.C. at 461, 526 S.E.2d at 654.
59. State agencies were protected broadly under Stone and Hunt, while local
government actors were subject to the narrower rules of Thompson and Lovelace.
Compare Stone, 347 N.C. at 482, 495 S.E.2d at 716 ("[W]e hold that the legislature
intended the public duty doctrine to apply to claims against the State under the Tort
Claims Act...."), with Thompson, 351 N.C. at 465, 526 S.E.2d at 652 ("This Court has not
heretofore applied the public duty doctrine to a claim against a municipality or county in a
situation involving any group or individual other than law enforcement.").
60. See Thompson, 351 N.C. at 465,526 S.E.2d at 652.
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The court's propensity to apply the public duty doctrine
differently to law enforcement officers than to other local government
actors was tested in Wood v. Guilford County.6 In Wood, a woman
who was assaulted inside the Guilford County courthouse sued the
county for her injuries, claiming they resulted from the county's
negligent failure to provide adequate security.62 The supreme court
explained that it would be too narrow a reading of Braswell to require
that local government officials fall under the statutory definition of
"law enforcement" in order to be protected by the public duty
doctrine.63 The court stated that the doctrine would best be applied
to local governments by asking whether the employee was "providing
a service analogous to police protection to the general public"' and
found that [t]he test of whether the public duty doctrine applies is a
functional one and includes consideration of the nature of the duty
assumed by the local government defendant."65 The court barred the
plaintiff's claim under the public duty doctrine, finding that the
county was protected from liability because the courthouse security
officers served the same function as law enforcement, exercising a
duty to protect the public as a whole.66 Yet even while the court in
Wood chose not to adopt a narrow view of what constituted police
protection, it recognized that it was applying the public duty doctrine
more narrowly to local government than it had previously applied the
doctrine to state government.67
While the supreme court in Lovelace, Thompson, and Wood
consistently limited the public duty doctrine's application to local
government, none of these decisions indicated how the court would
apply the public duty doctrine to state agencies. Thus, in Myers v.
McGrady,68 the Supreme Court of North Carolina directly addressed
the public duty doctrine's applicability to state defendants for the first
time since Stone and Hunt in 1998.69
61. 355 N.C. 161, 558 S.E.2d 490 (2002).
62. Id. at 162-63, 558 S.E.2d at 492-93.
63. Id. at 168, 558 S.E.2d at 496.
64. Id. at 167, 558 S.E.2d at 495.
65. Id. at 168, 558 S.E.2d at 496.
66. Id. at 166-68, 558 S.E.2d at 495, 496.
67. Id. at 169, 558 S.E.2d at 496.
68. 360 N.C. 460, 628 S.E.2d 761 (2006).
69. In Viar v. North Carolina Department of Transportation, 359 N.C. 400, 401, 610
S.E.2d 360, 361 (2005), the supreme court reviewed a decision of the court of appeals
regarding the public duty doctrine as it applies to the State, but dismissed the suit without
reaching the merits for violations of the rules of appellate procedure.
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The court of appeals in Myers found that "the public duty
doctrine applies where plaintiffs allege negligence through (a) failure
of law enforcement to provide protection from the misconduct of
others, and (b) failure of state departments or agencies to detect and
prevent misconduct of others through improper inspections."7 The
court reflected on the types of government actors that had been
protected by the public duty doctrine in the past and concluded that
the list was exhaustive.7 By limiting the public duty doctrine to law
enforcement and state inspectors, the court of appeals adopted an
identity test, applying the public duty doctrine strictly to government
actors having the same job description as public officials to whom the
supreme court had previously given protection.72 The court of
appeals found the public duty doctrine did not protect the forest
ranger in Myers because a forest ranger is neither law enforcement
nor a state inspector.73
When Myers reached the Supreme Court of North Carolina, the
court held that the public duty doctrine protected NCDENR from
liability, despite the fact that the forest ranger was not a law
enforcement officer or a state inspector.74 The court analyzed the
statutes in which the General Assembly listed the duties of NCDENR
and highlighted language that explains the responsibilities of forest
rangers. 75 Further, the supreme court found that the statutory duties
of forest rangers were owed to the public as a whole, distinguishing
this type of duty from those that "create a special duty or specific
obligation to a particular class of individuals."76  Thus, the court
placed special emphasis on the wording of the statutes conferring
duties on NCDENR, reiterating that the determination of what
constitutes a public duty rests with the intentions of the General
Assembly.77
By focusing on the specific responsibilities that the General
Assembly conferred on NCDENR and assessing whether NCDENR
70. Myers v. McGrady, 170 N.C. App. 501, 507, 613 S.E.2d 334, 339 (2005), rev'd., 360
N.C. 460, 628 S.E.2d 761 (2006).
71. Id.
72. See id. at 508, 613 S.E.2d at 340.
73. Id. at 507, 613 S.E.2d at 339. The court cited sections 14-288.1 and 113-55 of the
General Statutes of North Carolina, respectively, to explain that law enforcement officers
are authorized to make arrests and that forest rangers are expressly not permitted to make
arrests. See id. Thereby, the court emphasized that forest rangers cannot be law
enforcement officers.
74. Myers v. McGrady, 360 N.C. 460, 468, 628 S.E.2d 761, 767 (2006).
75. See id. at 467-68, 628 S.E.2d at 767.
76. Id. at 469, 628 S.E.2d at 767.
77. See id. at 467-68, 628 S.E.2d at 767.
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owes these duties to the public as a whole, the court in Myers used a
functional test in applying the public duty doctrine. The supreme
court did not compare forest rangers to law enforcement or
inspectors-groups to which the supreme court had previously
applied the public duty doctrine. Instead, the court focused on the
nature of the duties conferred by the General Assembly, which
authorized the agency to " 'take such action as it may deem necessary
to provide for the prevention and control of forest fires in any and all
parts of this state.' "'78 Taking note of this statute, the court
determined that "[t]he General Assembly has vested NCDENR with
broad powers to protect the health and well-being of the general
public and North Carolina's forests."79  Thus, the court in Myers
grounded its holding on the nature of the duties undertaken by forest
rangers-duties performed for the benefit of the public as a whole.
This functional test moved away from the identity test previously
applied in Lovelace,80 Thompson,81 and the court of appeals decision
in Myers." Thus, the court no longer compares the job title or job
description of the government defendant to safety inspectors or law
enforcement to assess whether the public duty doctrine would apply.
Myers also seems to move away from recognizing any distinction
between state and local government actors when it comes to applying
the public duty doctrine. 3 While the court did not explicitly abandon
this distinction, the Myers test stands in opposition to some of the
reasoning for applying the doctrine differently to these two groups.84
The rationale for applying the public duty doctrine differently
based on whether the defendant worked for state or local government
78. Id. at 467, 628 S.E.2d at 766-67 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-51 (2005)).
79. Id. at 468, 628 S.E.2d at 767.
80. See Lovelace v. City of Shelby, 351 N.C. 458, 461, 526 S.E.2d 652, 654 (2000)
("While this Court has extended the public duty doctrine to state agencies required by
statute to conduct inspections for the public's general protection, we have never expanded
the public duty doctrine to any local government agencies other than law enforcement
departments when they are exercising their general duty to protect the public." (citations
omitted)).
81. See Thompson v. Waters, 351 N.C. 462, 465, 526 S.E.2d 650, 652 (2000) ("This
Court has not heretofore applied the public duty doctrine to a claim against a municipality
or county in a situation involving any group or individual other than law enforcement.").
82. Myers v. McGrady, 170 N.C. App. 501, 507, 613 S.E.2d 334, 339 (2005) ("[Tlhe
public duty doctrine applies where plaintiffs allege negligence through (a) failure of law
enforcement to provide protection from the misconduct of others, and (b) failure of state
departments or agencies to detect and prevent misconduct of others through improper
inspections."), rev'd, 360 N.C. 460, 628 S.E.2d 761 (2006).
83. See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
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is unclear,85 especially in light of the fact that other jurisdictions do
not generally make such a distinction.86 The Lovelace and Thompson
courts may have seen Stone as holding that the public duty doctrine is
an element of the State's waiver of sovereign immunity.87 While
Myers clearly indicates that the public duty doctrine is entirely
distinct from a waiver of sovereign immunity,88 Stone did not
adequately recognize the distinction between the two doctrines.89
The common law doctrine of sovereign immunity provides that
the state may not be sued unless it consents to adjudication of
liability.90 As a partial waiver of the State's sovereign immunity, the
General Assembly has enacted the Tort Claims Act, which provides:
The Industrial Commission shall determine whether or not each
individual claim arose as a result of the negligence of any
officer, employee, involuntary servant or agent of the State
while acting within the scope of his office, employment, service,
agency or authority, under circumstances where the State of
North Carolina, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the laws of North Carolina. If the
Commission finds that there was negligence on the part of an
officer, employee, involuntary servant or agent of the State
while acting within the scope of his office, employment, service,
agency or authority that was the proximate cause of the injury
and that there was no contributory negligence on the part of the
claimant or the person in whose behalf the claim is asserted, the
85. Cf Brown-Graham, supra note 8, at 2327 ("One wonders whether it is at all
possible for the court to construct an intellectually defensible basis for limiting the
doctrine to law enforcement for local governments but applying it to safety inspections for
the State.").
86. See id. at 2327 n.216.
87. See infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
88. See Myers v. McGrady, 360 N.C. 460, 463, 628 S.E.2d 761, 764 (2006) (stating that
the public duty doctrine and sovereign immunity are two separate hurdles that potential
tort plaintiffs must overcome).
89. By emphasizing that the General Assembly endorsed the public duty doctrine
through the Tort Claims Act, Stone blurred the line between the public duty doctrine and
sovereign immunity. See Stone v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 347 N.C. 473, 479, 495 S.E.2d 711,
715 ("[W]e construe the Tort Claims Act as incorporating the existing common law rules
of negligence, including [the public duty] doctrine.").
90. See Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth. v. N.C. Indus. Comm'n, 336 N.C. 200,
207, 443 S.E.2d 716, 721 (1994) ("The doctrine of sovereign immunity-that the state
cannot be sued in its own courts without its consent-is firmly established in North
Carolina law.").
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Commission shall determine the amount of damages that the
claimant is entitled to be paid.91
Thus, the Tort Claims Act waives the State's sovereign immunity
under circumstances where the State would be liable if it were a
private person. Because the Tort Claims Act applies only to state
government,92 it does nothing to waive governmental immunity held
by local government. Instead, the waiver of governmental immunity
as it applies to counties and cities is based on other relevant statutes
that waive immunity when the municipality purchases insurance. 93
In applying the public duty doctrine to protect state agencies
from liability, the Stone court stated that the doctrine served the
''express intention" of the Tort Claims Act that state agencies should
have an enforceable duty to individuals only when a private person
would have such a duty.9 4 Because of the strong presumption that
sovereign immunity has not been waived unless a legislature has been
absolutely clear in granting a waiver,95 the supreme court inferred that
the General Assembly was allowing judicial discretion as to how to
apply the common law public duty doctrine.
In Stone, the court found that the Tort Claims Act incorporated
the public duty doctrine96 to fill whatever gaps were left by the Tort
Claims Act.97 By intertwining the public duty doctrine with the Tort
91. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291(a) (2005) (emphasis added). The Act appoints the
North Carolina Industrial Commission to hear tort claims against state agencies, rather
than having these claims heard in superior court. Id.
92. See Meyer v. Walls, 347 N.C. 97, 104-09, 489 S.E.2d 880, 883-87 (1997).
93. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-435 (permitting counties and cities to insure
themselves against liability for employees acting within the scope of employment and
waiving sovereign immunity to the extent of the insurance coverage for any action within
the government's function); § 160A-485 (authorizing cities to waive immunity from civil
liability in tort actions if they purchase liability insurance).
94. Stone v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 347 N.C. 473, 478-79, 495 S.E.2d 711, 714 (1998).
("The public duty doctrine ... serves the legislature's express intention to permit liability
against the State only when a private person could be liable.").
95. See Midgett v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 152 N.C. App. 666, 672, 568 S.E.2d 643, 648
(2002) (finding that " 'the State and its governmental units cannot be deprived of the
sovereign attributes of immunity except by a clear waiver by the lawmaking body'"
(quoting Orange County v. Heath, 282 N.C. 292, 296, 192 S.E.2d 308, 310 (1972))); cf
State ex rel. Reg'l Justice Info. Serv. Comm'n v. Saitz, 798 S.W.2d 705, 708 (Mo. 1990)
("Any purported statutory waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear on its face.").
96. Stone, 347 N.C. at 479, 495 S.E.2d at 715 (holding that "[u]ntil the legislature
clearly expresses that immunity is to be waived even in situations in which the common
law public duty doctrine would otherwise apply to bar a negligence claim, we construe the
Tort Claims Act as incorporating the existing common law rules of negligence, including
that doctrine").
97. See Myers v. McGrady, 360 N.C. 460, 466, 628 S.E.2d 761, 766 (2006) ("Because
'[p]rivate persons do not possess public duties,' the Court [in Stone] reasoned that the
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Claims Act, the court confused important distinctions between the
public duty doctrine and sovereign immunity. While the court in
Stone discussed the public duty doctrine in light of the Tort Claims
Act to explain how there was no conflict between the two doctrines,
the discussion allowed the court to infer later in Thompson and
Lovelace that the court's decision in Stone was limited to state
agencies.
To clarify any confusion it may have previously created, the
supreme court in Myers explained that it was not relying on any
waiver of the State's sovereign immunity to apply the public duty
doctrine to bar the plaintiff's claims.98 The court held that tort
plaintiffs must overcome both sovereign immunity and the public
duty doctrine when seeking to hold the State liable.99 Further, the
court stated that sovereign immunity is a separate concept that must
be considered prior to the question of whether the defendant owes a
duty to the particular plaintiff bringing suit against the State.'00 While
sovereign immunity applies differently to state government and local
government, the distinctions the court draws in Myers remove any
justification for applying the public duty doctrine differently to state
and local government. Thus, after Myers, the public duty doctrine
should apply equally to both state and local government.
Similarly, in Myers the court applied the public duty doctrine
using a functional test, focusing on the nature of the duty undertaken
by the government actor rather than the actor's identity.1 1 The
method in Myers for examining the nature of a duty involved two
determinations. First, is the duty conferred by statute? Second, is the
duty one conferred for the benefit of the public as a whole? The
General Assembly intended the public duty doctrine to apply to negligence actions filed
against state governmental entities pursuant to the Tort Claims Act." (quoting Stone, 347
N.C. at 478-79, 495 S.E.2d at 714)).
98. Myers, 360 N.C. at 465, 628 S.E.2d at 766 ("The public duty doctrine is a separate
rule of common law negligence that may limit tort liability, even when the State has
waived sovereign immunity.").
99. Id. at 463, 628 S.E.2d at 764.
100. Id.; see also Hunt v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 348 N.C. 192, 198, 499 S.E.2d 747, 751
(1998) ("[T]he defendant's failure to inspect [in Stone] did not create liability ...."). The
Georgia Supreme Court has also stated that "It]he initial question of duty precedes any
discussion of sovereign immunity." City of Rome v. Jordan, 426 S.E.2d 861, 862 n.1 (Ga.
1993) (Beasley, J., concurring) (citing Jordan v. City of Rome, 417 S.E.2d 730 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1992)). The Rome court also found that "the abrogation or waiver of sovereign
immunity in Georgia did not create a duty on the part of a municipality where none
existed before." Id. at 862.
101. Myers, 360 N.C. at 465-66, 628 S.E.2d at 766 (holding that the public duty doctrine
"provides that when a governmental entity owes a duty to the general public, particularly
a statutory duty, individual plaintiffs may not enforce the duty in tort").
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court did not compare state forest rangers with safety inspectors 1°2 or
compare the duties of forest rangers with police duties.0 3 Instead, the
application of a functional test eliminated the need for comparisons.
Applying the public duty doctrine based on the identity of an
actor or even based on duties analogous to those performed by a
particular actor is not a consistent method. First, applying the
doctrine solely based on an actor's identity is problematic because
such a method is both overinclusive and underinclusive. It is
overinclusive because the doctrine might be afforded to a government
actor who passes the identity test but is not really acting for the
benefit of the public as a whole."°  It is underinclusive because
immunity might be denied to an actor performing a duty for the
benefit of the general public, merely because the actor does not fit
into previously accepted categories.0 5 While it seems intuitive that
forest rangers attempting to put out forest fires should be given at
least the same protection from tort claims as seat belt inspectors, 0 6
the identity test offered by the court of appeals in Myers would have
prevented NCDENR from being treated with the deference afforded
to the Department of Labor. Second, applying the public duty
doctrine only to duties analogous to those performed by a particular
actor (such as a police officer) is underinclusive because it falsely
presumes the government actor has sufficiently broad duties to justify
consistent application of the public duty doctrine to similar actors.0 7
The court adopted such an approach in Wood by asking whether the
security officer was "providing a service analogous to police
102. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text (discussing Thompson).
103. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text (discussing Wood).
104. For example, an identity test would prevent a plaintiff from holding local
government liable for a police officer's negligent driving, even if the officer was not
responding to an emergency call. An identity test wrongly looks at the actor, rather than
the action.
105. For example, a forest ranger who puts out a forest fire is not technically fulfilling a
police function, but such a government employee has duties similar to a police officer to
protect people from harms created by the fire. For a further example that an identity test
can lead to underinclusiveness, see the Kansas Tort Claims Act, a statute that has been
amended to the point that it includes a list of two dozen exceptions to the State's waiver of
immunity. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6104 (1997).
106. See Hunt v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 348 N.C. 192, 194-95, 499 S.E.2d 747, 748-49
(1998).
107. In most jurisdictions "[t]he public duty doctrine extends beyond police duties to
all public entities." Christopher J. Roederer, Another Case in Lochner's Legacy, the
Court's Assault on New Property: The Right to the Mandatory Enforcement of a
Restraining Order Is a "Sham," "Nullity," and "Cruel Deception," 54 DRAKE L. REV. 321,
325 n.13 (2006) (citing DAN DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 271 (2003)).
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protection to the general public."10 8 Such a test considers the type of
duty undertaken by a government actor, rather than exclusively
considering the identity of the actor, and is thus an improvement over
a pure identity test. The problem with this partially functional test is
that it still compares the duties of one government actor with the
duties of another actor rather than looking at the nature of each
actor's duties as conferred by the General Assembly.
Using a partially functional test would breed confusion in
predicting and deciding outcomes. For example, if courts limit the
public duty doctrine to duties analogous to "police protection," these
courts still have a vague standard to apply as to what constitutes
police protection. 9 The problem with this partially functional test is
that a duty does not become protected until the court has evidence of
or can foresee a particular model actor engaging in that particular
activity. This standard is unclear and unpredictable because it leaves
too much to the whims of a particular court.
Moreover, applying the public duty doctrine based on one
particular type of duty would fail to protect dissimilar duties of equal
importance. For example, the general responsibilities of local fire
fighters to extinguish fires are very similar to those of NCDENR in
Myers. While fire fighters do not perform police duties, their
responsibilities are of similar urgency and require similar discretion.
After the Myers court adoption of a functional test to protect
NCDENR from liability for fighting forest fires, local fire fighters
should receive similar protection. Although the Supreme Court of
North Carolina has never addressed the applicability of the public
duty doctrine to local fire departments, the court of appeals held in
Willis v. Town of Beaufort"' that local fire departments were not
protected under the public duty doctrine after the supreme court's
decision in Lovelace."'
108. Wood v. Guilford County, 355 N.C. 161, 167, 558 S.E.2d 490, 495 (2002). See
supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text (discussing Wood).
109. The decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia in Rowe v. Coffey, 515 S.E.2d 375
(Ga. 1999), exemplifies that such a standard is not clear. In Rowe, the court applied the
public duty doctrine to protect a sheriff who decided not to put up a barricade to prevent
water damage during a storm. See id. at 375-76. When the road washed out, the missing
barricade caused several motor vehicle collisions and one death. See id. at 376. While
limiting the application of the public duty doctrine to those cases involving "police
protection," the court interpreted "police protection" broadly enough to protect the
government from liability for the sheriff's actions. See id. at 377. After Rowe, then, a duty
analogous to police protection includes the placement of barricades on the roadway.
110. 143 N.C. App. 106, 544 S.E.2d 600 (2001).
111. See id. at 110, 544 S.E.2d at 604. The result in Willis seems incongruous with
Myers, and it is difficult to imagine that Myers would not at least influence the court's
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After Myers, a better approach to determine whether a
government agency should be held liable for breaching a duty to an
individual is to determine whether the General Assembly conferred
on the government actor a duty to individuals. Focusing on the
nature of the duty implies that the intent of the General Assembly, as
evidenced by the relevant statute conferring a particular duty, should
be a court's point of reference. If a particular duty was intended to
benefit a narrow class of the public, then the agency responsible for
the duty will be liable to those the statute intended to protect. If the
duty was intended to benefit the public as a whole, then the public
duty doctrine would apply to bar claims for negligence.
This functional standard applied in Myers is clear and will be
applied more easily than either the identity or partially functional
approaches because the test involves only two steps: (1) determine
whether the General Assembly conferred a statutory duty on the
defendant government actor; and (2) analyze the intent of the
General Assembly to determine whether the statute is intended to
benefit the public as a whole or, instead, a more narrow class of
individuals. If the statute protects the public as a whole, then the
public duty doctrine prevents the government from being held liable.
If the statute protects a narrower class, then this class has standing to
sue.
While the courts still will need to assess whom the General
Assembly intended to protect within a given statute, this discretion
will be exercised within a manageable framework. Rather than
merely asking whether one duty is similar to another duty, the courts
will look directly at the intentions of state lawmakers to determine
whether they chose to protect a particular action from increased
liability.
The functional test in Myers is not only a clear alternative to
other approaches but the standard is in accord with the intentions of
the General Assembly and can be applied more consistently to
government agencies than can the other approaches. The Myers test
is in accord with the intentions of the General Assembly because it
looks directly at the relevant statutes in determining whom state
lawmakers intended to protect and treats government the same as a
private person would be treated. In Myers, the court looked directly
at the statute through which the General Assembly conferred fire
future application of the public duty doctrine to fire fighting duties. Since the Myers court
distanced itself from identity tests and partially functional tests, North Carolina courts
should adopt the functional test applied in Myers.
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fighting duties on NCDENR and determined from the statute that the
public duty doctrine should apply."2  Under a functional test, the
public duty doctrine's application rests on the wording provided by
state lawmakers.
More generally, the public duty doctrine recognizes the
"government's need to exercise discretion without the pressures of
potential tort liability.""' 3 Granting immunity from civil actions gives
government discretion as to where to allocate resources and gives
specific government actors the discretion to use their best judgment
under difficult circumstances without fear of being sued. 114 Moreover,
the public duty doctrine protects the abilities of government officials
to make discretionary decisions without second-guessing by courts
and juries, who are " 'ill-equipped to judge governmental decisions as
to how particular community resources should be or should have
been allocated to protect individual members of the public.' "115
The Myers test also comports with the General Assembly's goal,
explained in the Tort Claims Act, that the State should be treated as a
private person and should not risk liability where a private person
could not."6 By applying a functional test, Myers recognizes that a
''court must decide the appropriate scope of duty for government
defendants, just as it does for private defendants.""' 7 This recognition
is part of why "[tihe applicability of the public duty doctrine is a
question of law to be raised at the pleading stage of a case." ' 8 Like a
private person, the government cannot be negligent if it does not owe
an enforceable duty.
In practice, courts seem more likely to apply the public duty
doctrine when a government employee negligently fails to act and
allows harm to occur (nonfeasance) than when the employee
negligently acts and causes harm (misfeasance)." 9  It is well
established in tort law that "government is not liable for non-action
112. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
113. Brown-Graham, supra note 8, at 2325.
114. Id. at 2324-25 (stating general public policy reasons cited for maintaining the
public duty doctrine).
115. Brown-Graham, supra note 8, at 2325 (quoting Ezell v. Cockrell, 902 S.W.2d 394,
398 (Tenn. 1995).
116. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291(a) (2005).
117. Michael Tardif & Rob McKenna, Washington State's 45-Year Experiment in
Governmental Liability, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 19 (2005).
118. Brown-Graham, supra note 8, at 2323.
119. See Tardif & McKenna, supra note 117, at 21 (noting that "[t]he public duty
doctrine had one anomaly: it protected officials when they declined to act, but did not
protect them when they acted").
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unless state law does impose such a duty."'' 20 Moreover, courts apply
the public duty doctrine more often when the government agency's
actions only indirectly cause harm. The North Carolina Court of
Appeals stated as much in Moses v. Young:1
2
'
An exhaustive review of the public duty doctrine as applied in
North Carolina reveals no case in which the public duty
doctrine has operated to shield a defendant from acts directly
causing injury or death. Rather, the application of the public
duty doctrine in [North Carolina] has been confined to cases
where the defendant's actions proximately or indirectly result in
injury.122
When the General Assembly confers a duty on a government
agency to protect the public from third-party harm, the public duty
doctrine protects the relevant agency from becoming a guarantor of
safety. In doing so, the public duty doctrine treats the government
agency in the same way that a private party would be treated.
123
Aside from being more consistent with the intentions of the
General Assembly, the Myers test also provides a consistent method
of applying the public duty doctrine uniformly to various government
actors. Because the inquiry into whether to apply the doctrine begins
with the nature of the duty (or the action) involved rather than the
identity of the actor, the functional test treats similar duties similarly,
no matter who undertakes the duty. As discussed above, both the
identity and partially functional tests focus first on the actor involved,
and thus these tests will necessarily treat other actors differently.
In his dissent in Stone, Justice Orr argued that law enforcement
officers are unique and require unique protections, largely because
they protect the public from criminals, whose actions are
unpredictable.'24 While law enforcement officers have unique duties,
these officers are not alone in possessing responsibilities to protect
120. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at
1035 (5th ed. 1984).
121. 149 N.C. App. 613, 561 S.E.2d 332 (2002).
122. Id. at 616, 561 S.E.2d at 334.
123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965) ("There is no duty so to control
the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another
unless (a) a special relationship exists between the actor and the third person which
imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or (b) a special
relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the other a right to
protection.").
124. Stone v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 347 N.C. 473, 484, 495 S.E.2d 711, 718 (1998) (Orr,
J., dissenting).
[Vol. 85
PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE
the public. 125 By applying the Myers test to distinguish among duties
rather than among actors, courts can consistently protect government
actors whose duties are intended to benefit the public as a whole.
The Myers test is straightforward in its application and is
consistent both with the intentions of the General Assembly and as
applied across the range of government actors and duties. By moving
away from an identity test or a partially functional test, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina adopted a workable test that should apply
equally to both state and local government actors. As a truly
functional standard, the Myers test for applying the public duty
doctrine will enable the Industrial Commission and the courts to
fairly impose liability on state actors where appropriate and protect
the State from liability where the State most needs protection.
Focusing on the nature of the duty conferred on a government actor
will allow for a more rational and consistent application of the public
duty doctrine.
RYAN RICH
125. For example, the duties of a forest ranger to extinguish fires are certainly duties to
protect the public, even if they are not "police duties."
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